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Domestic revenue mobilisation is key to sustainable development 
finance  –  only  self-sufficiency  will  allow  the  development  of 
fully-functioning  states  with  flourishing  systems  of  political 
representation  and  economies  reflecting  societies’  expressed 
preferences in regard to, for example, inequality.  Tax evasion 
and tax avoidance are important insofar as they affect both the 
volume and nature of government finances. This paper estimates 
the  total  cost  to  developing  countries  of  these  leakages  as 
US$385 billion annually, dwarfing any potential increase in aid. 
An additional result suggests that doubling aid to low income 
countries may have little positive revenue effect but damage the 











* Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre 
   Queen Elizabeth House 
   University of Oxford 
   alex.cobham@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
 
                                                
1 This paper was initially prepared for the International Policy Dialogue: New Sources of Development 
Financing, Frankfurt/Main, 24 August 2005, organised by InWEnt – Capacity Building International on 
behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Helpful 
comments from participants (and those at the QEH 50
th Anniversary Conference on some aid-related 
material) are gratefully acknowledged, as are the valuable comments of Richard Murphy and Jonathan 
Lipkin. Alex Cobham is Supernumerary Fellow in Economics at St Anne’s College, Oxford and 




This  paper  considers  the  effects  of  tax  avoidance  and  evasion  on  the  financing  of 
development. Although funding for new aid commitments is important, it is argued that 
(i) sustainable development requires developing states to approach fiscal independence, 
and (ii) that the annual revenue cost of tax leakages is well in excess of aid flows.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: first it surveys the structure of tax systems in rich and 
poor regions of the world and developments during the last three decades (section 2); 
then it sets out a simple model of all leakages, and uses existing work and new data to 
generate  the  first  comprehensive  estimate  of  the  cost  to  developing  countries  in 
revenues foregone (section 3). Finally, section 4 concludes with a call for a new agenda. 
It is useful first to assess the context – both political and ethical – in which tax evasion 
and avoidance feature, and in which sources of development finance are considered.  
 
Meet the ‘new’ sources, same as the old 
   
In the light of recent commitments to increase official development assistance (ODA) to 
poorer  countries,  there  has  been  renewed  focus  on  identifying  the  most  promising 
potential sources of new revenues which OECD country governments can allocate to 
development  assistance.  In  this  context,  amid  discussion  of  environmental  taxes 
(including the airline tax backed by French President Jacques Chirac), global lotteries 
and  the  proposed  International  Financing  Facility  (IFF),  the  topic  of  tax  avoidance 
seems somewhat out of place. Arguably however it is both the most promising long-
term source of new funds for development, and also a politically attractive medium-
term option. 
 
The context of seeking ‘new’ funds for development finance is the commitment (finally 
achieved) to a timetable to increase aid budgets to 0.7% of GNI by 2015, and to 0.51% 
by 2010. In the context of high-income OECD countries with revenues typically in the 
range of 20-30% of GDP, there is clearly no binding fiscal constraint preventing greater 
allocation.  The  problem  that  does exist  however  is  political  and  two-fold:  first,  the 
simple question of obtaining sufficient political will to carry out the commitment, even 
in  the  face  of  pressing  domestic  fiscal  demands;  and  second,  the  related  issue  of 
maintaining that will (and that level of funding) in a future of domestic economic and 
political uncertainty.
2 Various studies have demonstrated the instability and even pro-
cyclicality of aid flows, and the extent to which these undermine the benefits of aid.
3 
 
Given these problems, the criteria on which potential new sources of funds should be 
judged are these: will they make the problem of obtaining political support easier, and 
will they provide a reliable stream of funds into the future? It is clear, for example, that 
the IFF addresses the first criteria well, but potentially at the expense of the second: that 
is, while using future aid budgets to increase ODA now is politically easy since current 
                                                
2 Note that the conference was held in Frankfurt, with the keynote address given by a development 
minister whose party is widely expected to lose elections within two months. Germany is also a good 
example of a revenue-rich OECD country facing pressing budgetary concerns. 
3 Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find that uncertainty about aid receipts has a robust negative impact on 
the benefits to recipient countries; Pallage and Robe (2001) find aid to be pro-cyclical and a source of 
macroeconomic volatility; Bulí￿ and Hamann (2005) find ‘that the main factors underlying the volatility 
and unpredictability of aid have not been addressed, a situation that does not bode well for the success of 
the new initiatives and lending facilities that are being proposed’ (p.1). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 3 
 
budgets are unaffected, the possibility of maintaining aid flows after 2015 – when base 
levels  of  aid  budgets  are  to  be  used  to  make  payments  on  the  IFF  –  makes  the 
sustainability questionable at best. 
 
The widely-recognised political difficulty of introducing new taxes has coloured the 
agenda in this aspect, leading to a focus on taxes in areas that are either thought to seem 
relatively remote to the public (e.g. on currency transactions) or can be justified by a 
wider appeal to public concerns (e.g. on airplane fuel). In this respect, the criteria of 
obtaining political will is likely to be met most easily for an alternative measure – the 
more effective application of existing taxes, forcing more agents to pay the existing 
(publicly-agreed) level of social contribution. As such, the best ‘new’ source for the 
shorter-term increase of aid budgets may be an old one.
4  
 
The oldest – and ultimately, the only sustainable – source of development finance is 
taxation in poor countries themselves.
5 No view of a sustainable future equilibrium for 
these  countries  –  however  optimistic  or  pessimistic  about  the  levels  of  human 
development and economic wellbeing that are likely – can rest on the assumption of 
permanent aid dependence. As such, the longer-term goal must be to put government 
revenues on a sustainable footing, consistent with the levels of expenditure demanded. 
 
With  these  goals  of  varying  time  horizon,  the  importance  of  tax  evasion  and  tax 
avoidance for development are evident. Tax evasion and tax avoidance have moved 
swiftly up the development agenda in recent years. Following Oxfam’s influential 2000 
report on the “billions” in revenues lost to developing country governments through 
corporate use of tax havens, NGOs have become increasingly focused on the issue. The 
cases of Enron and WorldCom among others have brought a range of tax practices into 
the general public domain for the first time. The Tax Justice Network, an umbrella 
group  reflecting  wider  interest  among  NGOs,  has  been  increasingly  successful  in 
generating media interest and provoking a response from business.  
 
It is not however possible to make a simple connection between taxes paid and the 
availability  of  funds  with  which  to  finance  development.  To  begin  to  address  the 
question of how tax evasion and avoidance impact on development, significant analysis 
is required. This can be seen by considering the following questions: Imagine a poor 
country in which 40% of economic activity is completely untaxed: what would be the 
impact  (on  economic  activity,  growth,  investment  and  employment;  on  government 
revenues and social spending; on poverty, inequality and development) if government 
was suddenly able to make such avoidance completely impossible? Or imagine a rich 
country offering corporate subsidies in the form of tax loopholes regarding offshore 
business registration: who would gain and who would lose if this was declared illegal?  
 
To consider policy to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance it is first necessary to 
establish  the  underlying  objectives.  Policymakers  cannot  be  motivated  by  a  simple 
moral position (e.g. that certain behaviour is ‘bad’) without exploring the implications 
                                                
4 The speed with which anti-avoidance measures can be made effective is not clear; but it is not 
unreasonable to consider substantial returns over the period 2007-2015 – even if this year’s revenues may 
not be simply increased.  
5 It goes without saying that the ability to raise this finance depends on taxable economic activity 
occurring, and that both domestic and international trade are important components of economic growth.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 4 
 
more fully. It is not clear on the face of it, for example, what the moral distinction 
should be between the following:  
-  tax  minimisation  strategies  ranging  from  transfer  pricing  to  the  creation  of 
special purpose vehicles or nominal transfer of headquarters; 
-  under-reporting;  
-  bribery of tax officials;  
-  refusal to pay;  
-  lobbying of  governments to reduce tax liability or effective incidence of tax 
system;  
-  lobbying by multinationals of ‘home’ country governments to pressure ‘host’ 
country governments to the same effect; or 
-  lobbying  via  international  institutions  (IMF,  World  Bank,  WTO)  to  achieve 
similar effects. 
 
What is it that makes some or all of these either good or bad or indifferent? One can 
conceive of moralities which might place, for example, bribery and refusal to pay at the 
top of a list of bad behaviour – and who would condemn legitimate business lobbying?  
 
Where the ultimate concern is with development however, an argument can be made 
that  the  important  distinguishing  factor  should  be  the  extent  to  which  development 
opportunities are restricted by actual reductions in tax paid. It could be this – rather than 
any desire to pass judgment, nor yet any perspective on the relative power of state and 
the private sector – which should motivate analysis of tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Any form of cosmopolitanism directed towards human development objectives could 
then point towards moral equivalence among the above list.  
 
However, this approach – at least, as stated baldly here - ignores the underlying political 
processes.  While  it  may  be  argued  that  such  a  brand  of  cosmopolitanism  should 
normatively inform the views of the voting public, it is presumably the settled view of 
the  latter  on  the  extent  of  official  development  assistance  and  relative  levels  of 
contribution  that  must  set  the  necessary  boundaries  in  rich  countries.  Bob  Geldof 
recognised this in leading the Live 8 concerts this summer to raise awareness and hence 
change those views.  
 
Within rich countries then, the moral approach increasingly favoured by the tax justice 
movement is one of targeting and shaming those who appear to be shouldering a tax 
burden much smaller than the public might think ‘fair’: ‘In the US, 60 per cent of 
corporations with at least US$250 million in assets reported no federal tax liability for 
any of the years between 1996 and 2000’ (p.15, Christian Aid, 2005). An example from 
the UK is the 2
nd October 2005 article in The Observer titled ‘Uproar at BAT' s tiny UK 
tax bill’ (£13m of tax paid on £9 billion of pre-tax profit over the last five years). 
 
Within  poor  countries,  the  approach  of  assessing  whether  the  tax  contributions  of 
different actors meet the settled view of citizens is often complicated by greater doubts 
over  the  effective  representation  achieved  by  political  systems.  Moreover,  different 
forms of tax-reducing behaviour will have different social and political implications. 
This  paper  focuses  on  direct  economic  impacts  however,  and  in  this  view  the 
importance for developing countries of tax evasion (or any other form of tax-reducing 
behaviour) lies not in the form it takes but rather in its effects. The key is to consider 
existing tax structures in terms of their human development impact. This occurs through QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 5 
 
both revenue and non-revenue channels, driving differing outcomes in (a) growth, (b) 
poverty, (c) inequality and (d) political representation. These in turn set the parameters 
for the human development opportunities of the population of individual developing 
countries.
6  While  there  are  then  important  reasons  to  analyse  the  tax  behaviour  of 
multinational  companies,  and  the  effects  of  tax  havens,  these  are  increasingly  the 
subject of attention from both campaigners and researchers.
7  
 
Here  a  broader  approach  is  taken,  with  a  view  to  considering  how  evasion  and 
avoidance affect the ultimate prospects for sustainable development and its financing. 
The paper proceeds from this basis to analyse the implications of tax behaviour and 
policy for development prospects. Section 3 sets out a simple model of an economy and 
taxation, identifying the main leakages and drawing on existing research to evaluate the 
costs  of  each  in  revenues  foregone.  It  then  uses  a  straightforward  methodology  to 
calculate, for each region of the world, the potential tax foregone through a previously 
under-researched channel: evasion and avoidance in the shadow economy. In this way it 
is  able  to  provide  an  overall  estimate  for  the  total  lost  tax  revenue  in  developing 
countries.  
 
Section 4 then draws some preliminary conclusions on the extent to which policymakers 
can  support  development  finance  through  changes  in  these  areas,  and  makes  some 
suggestions for an agenda for future research – an agenda which is clearly lacking. First, 
section 2 outlines the main differences in tax structures in different regions of the world, 
and highlights some significant facts. 
 
2. COMPARATIVE TAX STRUCTURES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Figure 1 shows the main differences in tax structure between regions of the world, 
showing average revenues from different taxes as a share of GDP in each of the last 
three decades. ‘Direct tax’ includes all taxes on personal and corporate income, ‘Sales 
tax’ those on the sale of goods and services (including but not limited to VAT) and 
‘Trade tax’ those levied on exports and imports of goods and services. 
 
The richer countries of the world have grown their overall tax revenues since the 1970s. 
The  EU-15  (see  panel  a)  are characterised  by  total central  government  revenues  of 
around one-third of GDP. The direct tax take increased from the 1970s to 1980s, but 
overall  growth  was  primarily  due  to  increases  in  the  revenue  from  sales  taxes.  In 
contrast, panel (b) sees the US exhibit lower overall revenues and shows continuing 
growth in direct taxation only. Recall the data are for central government only; though 
not shown here, reliance on sales taxes at state level has increased over the same period, 
broadly in line with the EU experience. Japan (panel c) shows some sales tax growth, 
but overwhelmingly it is an increase in direct tax revenues that occurred concurrently 
with the country’s massive economic development during the period.  
 
                                                
6 There are of course many different views of the components of human development and their relative 
importance – Alkire (2002) provides a useful survey of list-based approaches.  I do not enter this debate 
here, but proceed on the basis that the main elements are sufficiently widely agreed as to be 
uncontroversial. Note that growth is instrumental in achieving human development goals, rather than an 
objective in itself. Cobham (2005) sets out the goals of taxation structures in more detail. 
7 Tax competition is not discussed further here, though its importance should not be underestimated as a 
vehicle of reducing tax revenues in both rich and poor countries. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 6 
 
Panels (d)-(i) show the development of tax revenues in the poorer regions of the world. 
A number of trends are evident:  
·  as in the richer countries, reliance on sales tax grew consistently;  
·  revenues from trade taxes fell, with widespread liberalisation; and 
·  revenues from direct taxes typically rose from the 1970s to the 1980s, but then 
fell back again in the 1990s. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean saw fairly stable direct tax revenues, falling trade tax 
(with trade liberalisation taking hold) and increasing reliance on sales tax. East Asia, at 
roughly similar levels of per capita income, exhibited a similar pattern, albeit with lower 
trade tax and hence overall revenues (around 2% and 14% of GDP respectively in East 
Asia,  compared  to  around  4%  and  17%  in  the  former).  Aggregates  for  the  broad 
CEEWA region show increases driven by a convergence of direct tax revenues towards 
western European levels, and great increases in the 1990s in sales tax receipts.  
 
The Middle East and North Africa is a general exception, showing a significant and 
sustained reduction in each tax component, most notably in direct tax. This is driven by 
those  countries  whose  vast  resource  wealth  eases  revenue  mobilisation.  South  Asia 
exhibits by far the lowest contribution from direct taxation of any region, and by far the 
lowest total tax revenue. Despite managing notable increases in sales taxes during the 
period, the overall growth has been constrained by a fall in the (originally dominant) 
share of trade tax. Sub-Saharan Africa also increased sales tax revenues, but a fall in 
already low direct tax revenue from the 1980s to 1990s has restricted the overall growth 
here. In both these poorest regions of the world, trade taxes are responsible for more 
than a third of total tax revenue. 
 
The difference in the ability of rich countries to obtain direct tax revenues (around 12-
18%  of  GDP)  and  that  of  poor  countries  (typically  2-6%)  is  stark.  A  possible 
implication is that much more economic activity in the latter takes place outwith the 
scope  of  direct  tax  structures  –  in  the  informal  economy.  This  is  addressed  in  the 
following section. 
 
There are important differences between the different regions of poorer countries, which 
drive important differences in ultimate policy recommendations. Cobham (2005) deals 
with these in more detail, but two main points can be noted: 
·  Low-income countries (primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia) face a 
critical constraint to their development in the form of low overall revenues; no 
successful development path can be envisaged which does not eventually lead to 
sufficient domestic revenue mobilisation to ensure fiscal independence; 
·  Middle-income countries are less revenue-constrained but face other problems – 
in the Middle East of weak political representation linked (at least in part) to 
‘resource curse’ effects of oil wealth,
8 and in Latin America of poverty resulting 
not  so  much  from  low  absolute  incomes  as  from  high  inequality  in  the 
distribution of income. In both cases, increasing direct tax revenues is likely to 
be important. 
                                                
8 Ross (2004) finds robust evidence for the importance of taxation:  ‘The tests I carry out above find no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that higher taxes relative to income lead to democratization […] The 
tests are, however, consistent with the hypothesis that higher taxes relative to government services tend 
make states more democratic’ (p.28). The implication is that states where government services are paid 
for through non-tax sources are less likely to enjoy democratic development.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 7 
 
 
Almost every region increased the contribution of direct taxes during the 1980s, but 
then saw this reversed during the 1990s. This was the period, as Emran and Stiglitz 
(2002) detail, during which the orthodoxy of switching to VAT-type taxation emerged. 
This orthodox view states that since these taxes impose a lower administrative burden 
on governments than systems of direct taxation, and since models show they can be 
relatively undistortionary, they represent the easiest option for developing countries to 
increase their tax revenues – not least when they are already losing trade tax revenues 
through liberalisation.  
 
However, Emran and Stiglitz show that once models are adapted to allow the existence 
of an informal sector, the results no longer hold. In fact, ‘the standard revenue-neutral 
selective reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces welfare under plausible conditions. 
Moreover, a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes may 
also reduce welfare’ (p.1).  
 
More recently, empirical analysis by IMF researchers has shown that most low-income 
countries  were  completely  unable  to  achieve  even  such  a  (welfare-reducing) 
compensation for lost trade tax revenue. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) show that on 
average, low-income countries replaced less than 30% of the lost revenues. In other 
words,  trade  liberalisation  systematically  undermined  the  attempts  of  low-income 
country  governments  to  mobilise  domestic  revenues  –  it  increased,  in  fact,  their 
dependence on relatively volatile external (aid) finance.  
 
Some simple calculations illustrating the potential scale of these effects are shown in 
Table 1. Data for trade tax revenues and aid flows are scaled up on a per capita basis, to 
show the relative size. These turn out to be exactly equal in low-income countries, 
making it clear that even a doubling of aid flows to low-income countries by 2015 – as 
called for at the Gleneagles G8 meeting – would only allow a revenue increase at best 
less than a third this size, if current trade liberalisation positions are carried through the 
Doha round of negotiations.   
 
A  stronger  effect  would  be  to  greatly  increase  the  revenue  dependence  of  those 
countries  on  the  donors,  while  weakening  the  political  representation  link  outlined 
above. At best there is a much smaller increase in revenues than doubling aid might 
provide, and some undermining of the taxation-representation link.  
 
This brief analysis strongly suggests that unthinking removal of this important revenue 
source can do significant damage. In the low income countries for example, trade taxes 
represent almost 20% of non-grant government revenues. Even if the more optimistic 
Baunsgaard & Keen (2005) result is used, that 30% of the lost revenue can be replaced, 
the growth effects of liberalisation would have to be large indeed to justify the policy if 
revenue  sustainability  is  treated  as  a  serious  goal.  Progress  in  the  Doha  round 
negotiations must take the costs of liberalisation in poorer countries into account if 
further damage to that goal is not to result. 
 
Direct  taxation  improvements  may  then  be  the  best  remaining  option  for  many 
developing countries facing with a range of goals: greater revenue independence, lower 
income inequality and clearer channels of political representation.  
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3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX: CHANNELS OF LOST REVENUES 
 
Let all income (Y) generated by economic activity (W) within an economy be denoted 
Y(W). Let the country’s tax system have an effective average tax rate of t %. In the 
absence of any leakages, the total tax revenue would be  
 
T0 = tY(W)               …(1) 
 
However, a number of leakages do occur.  
 
1. Income derived from shadow economy. First, much economic activity is not reported 
to  the  authorities.  This  activity  ranges  from  that  of  unregistered  businesses,  to 
undeclared profits of registered businesses, to profits from criminal activity (e.g. drug-
trafficking), to work performed ‘off the books’. The share of total economic activity is 
denoted  s, and  tax  revenue will be  diminished as s is  larger (the shadow economy 
accounts for a larger share of all activity):  
 
T1 = tY(W(1-s))             …(2) 
 
Much income from officially-recognised activity is also not (fully) taxed. Two main 
categories can be distinguished. 
 
2. Income accruing to assets which are held offshore (typically by wealthy individuals) 
and are therefore untaxed. Let this share of total national income be denoted h.   
 
This channel of tax leakage has been researched by the Tax Justice Network (2005), 
using various estimates of offshore assets (from the BIS and various industry sources). 
These are used to generate a conservative central estimate of total assets held offshore 
by high net-worth individuals of $11.5 trillion across various financial asset types and 
property. The implied annual income is estimated at $860 billion. 
 
T2 = t[Y(W(1-s))-h]            …(3) 
 
3. Corporate profits which are shifted to other jurisdictions (e.g. by transfer pricing) 
where lower tax rates apply. Let this share of national income be denoted p.  
 
Multinational  enterprises  (MNEs)  are  often  singled  out  for  their  ability  to  obtain 
favourable tax treatment in poorer countries, and to transfer taxable profits elsewhere. In 
response to recent pressure, many large companies now provide illustrative examples of 
their tax contribution, for example the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS):  
 
The UK exchequer received £2,200 million in tax directly from RBS and our staff in 2004. 
This included £110 million in business rates alone. This is equivalent to: 
– Working for the government alone from January through March 
– Funding for nearly 600,000 school places 
– A half-pence off income tax 
– The salaries of 121,000 staff nurses 
– The cost of building 270 brand new secondary schools 
– Nearly 1.5 times the entire budget of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
– Just under the total revenues taken from Spirit Duties 
- RBS 2005, p.2. 
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One alternative presentation is to calculate an effective tax rate by taking tax paid as a 
share of profits.
9 This yields for RBS a value of 26.6% in 2004, 26.7% in 2003 and 
24.2% in 2002; somewhat below the UK’s main corporate tax rate of 30%. This type of 
unflattering simplistic calculation has led accountants PwC to release a suggestion of 
how companies should report their “Total Tax Contribution”, since using ‘companies’ 
published financial statements and [making] a calculation of current year tax payments 
to  profits…  may  not  produce  a  meaningful  result,  since,  for  example,  profits  are 
adjusted for tax purposes and due to timing of tax payments’ (PwC, 2005, p.5). 
 
Unfortunately systematic and comparable data on actual profits and tax behaviour of 
MNEs  are  not  yet  easily  available.  The  most  complete  series  is  that  of  the  US 
Department of Commerce on the accounts of US MNEs abroad. A similar calculation to 
that above allows effective tax rates to be calculated, and these are shown in figure 2.  
 
While the majority of tax rates in each period is less than 30%, it is clear is that there is 
considerable variation. In some jurisdictions – notably Nigeria, where oil payments are 
the main factor – the rates are significantly higher. While there are exceptions, the rates 
paid are consistently lower during 1993-97 than the earliest period, 1983-86.  
 
Tax revenues are then shrunk via each of these (offshore asset-holding and corporate 
profit-shifting) channels:  
 
T3 = t[Y(W(1-s))-h-p]            …(4) 
 
4. Tax competition. A further type of leakage occurs through downward pressure on the 
effective tax rate t (leading to a new rate, denoted tc). Tax competition from competing 
investment locations, lobbying from wealthy individuals and corporates, international 
pressures and the trade liberalisation agenda may all contribute to reduce the tax rates 
paid by high-income individuals, large companies and importers. Even allowing for 
some shifting of tax burden to less mobile targets (labour and consumption), average t 
may fall nonetheless (as has been seen with trade liberalisation). The implications for 
poverty,  inequality,  growth,  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy  and  ultimately  for 
development – of both a fall in revenues and the shift in incidence – are largely left for 
other work, but should be recognised as potentially damaging at least. 
 
T4 = tc[Y(W(1-s))-h-p]   where tc < t        …(5) 
 
5. Non-payment. A final leakage which may be significant is that of taxes which are due 
but not paid, for various reasons. The value of unpaid taxes in Kenya is calculated by 
the Kenyan Revenue Authority at US$1.32 billion, in the region of 50% of all revenues 
(Christian Aid, 2005) – little is thought likely to be recovered. The sum of unpaid taxes 
each year may be denoted U: 
 
 T5 = tc[Y(W(1-s))-h-p] - U            …(6) 
 
Figure 3 summarises all the above leakages in an economy. In the remainder of this 
section the last two are ignored. The extent of tax competition’s impact on revenues is 
of course disputed, and in fact more complicated than as modelled here since lower 
                                                
9 Note this calculation refers to profits pre tax, goodwill amortisation and integration costs (PPTGAI). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 10 
 
effective tax rates may – depending on tax incidence and a range of economic and 
political conditions – lead to higher investment levels, perhaps temporarily. The extent 
of  unpaid  tax  differs  widely  across  countries,  and  will  depend  not  only  on 
administrative effectiveness but a range of factors from firm mortality rates to standard 
accounting practice. This is left for other work.  
 
Focusing on leakages 1-3 within the model, since in any known economy s, h, p > 0:  
 
  T2 < T1 < T0. 
 
The  difference  T1-T2  has  been  investigated  in  Oxfam  (2000)  and  TJN  (2005).  The 
former found the cost of corporate tax evasion to developing countries to be of the order 
of $50 billion annually (not far short of the total ODA budget). The latter provide a 
conservative estimate for the global revenue cost of offshore asset-holding by wealthy 
individuals of $255 billion. A rough calculation
10 suggests that around $50 billion of 
this tax burden is likely to fall on developing countries, giving them a total bill for these 
leakages of $100 billion per year. 
 
This paper uses existing shadow economy  data to  offer the first estimates
11 for tax 
losses through the shadow economy channel (T0-T1). The most recent, consistent data 
on the informal sector across each region of the world is that provided by Schneider 
(2005).  After  consideration  of  various  approaches  to  estimating  the  size  of  shadow 
economies  (including  the  use  of  surveys,  of  indirect  approaches  based  on  national 
statistics  on  income,  labour  force,  transactions,  currency  demand  or  electricity 
consumption), Schneider favours the use of latent estimation using a dynamic multiple-
indicators  multiple-causes  (DYMIMIC)  model.  This  generates  a  comparable  set  of 
plausible results across 145 countries, expressed as percentages of the officially reported 
GDP statistics.   
 
The methodology is simple. First, I assume a one-to-one relationship between economic 
activity and income generated: that is, reducing W by a factor of e.g. (1-s) has the same 
effect on Y. This allows the tax effects of income generated in the shadow economy to 
be modelled. I then take data on the existing share of tax revenue in official GDP and on 
the shadow economy as a share of official GDP. The implied potential revenue impact 
is obtained by simply taking the product of the two – that is, by assuming it were 
possible  for  governments  to  bring  the  shadow  economy  completely  into  the  formal 
sector and then tax it at current standard rates.  
 
                                                
10 High-income countries accounted for 80% of world GDP in 2003 (WDI data). If offshore asset-holding 
by high net wealth individuals is assumed to be as likely in developing countries as elsewhere, then we 
can allocate 20% of the lost revenue to the former: or $51bn. Two contradictory arguments can be 
considered in regard to this assumption: on the one hand, since tax systems are more likely to be effective 
in high-income countries, then individuals have greater incentives to go offshore; but on the other hand, if 
wealthy individuals in poorer countries are more likely to invest overseas (due to worse investment 
opportunities domestically), going offshore is a more natural part of the investment process (than for e.g. 
a US individual holding NYSE stocks). Baker (2005) estimates that half of the estimated $1 trillion 
dollars a year of ‘dirty’ money flowing into the world banking system stems from developing and 
transition economies. 
11 To the best of my knowledge – but please contact me if this is inaccurate. A problem associated with 
the lack of a critical mass of research on this and related topics (see later discussion) is the somewhat 
scattered nature of the literature. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 11 
 
This  inevitably  overestimates  the  actual  potential  tax  effect,  since  economic  theory 
dictates  that  some  activities  which  are  worthwhile  at  zero  tax  rates  and  with  zero 
administrative burden will become infeasible when these conditions are less favourable. 
Moreover, a law change would be required to ‘formalise’ illegal activities. The key 
potential tax gain is from the section of shadow activity relating to tax evasion on legal 
activities. At least anecdotally, the share of this section is likely to be much higher in 
developing  countries  than  their  OECD  counterparts  –  e.g.  the  main  or  even  only 
subjects  of  income  tax  in  many  sub-Saharan  African  countries  are  said  to  be 
government  employees.  The  potential  revenue  increases  are  then  likely  to  be  most 
realistic in the developing countries in the sample. 
 
Table 2 shows the key results by region, the third column the potential tax revenue 
increase. The results are broadly in line with the view that if most developing countries 
had tax administrations with the capacity (and will) to minimise evasion and avoidance, 
their potential revenues are not dissimilar to those of OECD countries. The outlier in 
this relationship is south Asia, where even this ‘potential’ revenue level is well below 
that of any other region. Sub-Saharan Africa however is in line, and even above East 
Asia.  
 
Referring back to Table 1, the implied percentage changes would lead to government 
revenues of $83 per capita in low income countries, as against $54 now, and aid flows 
of $10. It is evident that the potential effects of ‘formalising’ the shadow economy 
dwarf those of even doubling aid.  
 
Finally, it is useful to express the value of foregone tax, as in the Oxfam (2000) and 
TJN (2005) studies, as a current dollar value. Table 3 shows this, by region. While these 
numbers  are  currently  preliminary  (a  more  thorough  study  will  update  them),  they 
provide a strong indicator as to the approximate size of the revenues foregone. The 
maximum value for developing countries is $285 billion. As noted above however, the 
breadth of activity within the shadow economy make such a complete ‘formalisation’ 
quite impossible. The persistence and size of a shadow economy in the world’s richest 
countries (around 16-18% of official GDP) underline this.  
 
A more realistic goal for developing countries would be over to reduce by, say, two 
thirds, the difference between the size of their current shadow economies and the OECD 
level.  The  effects  of  achieving  such  a  goal  are  also  shown  in  table  3,  as  ‘feasible 
formalisation’, and generate a value which remains in excess of that identified for other 
leakages: $110 billion, for the year 2003.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The importance of being evasive 
 
Domestic revenue mobilisation is key to sustainable development finance – only self-
sufficiency  will  allow  the  development  of  fully-functioning  states  with  flourishing 
systems  of  political  representation  and  economies  reflecting  society’s  expressed 
preferences in regard to, for example, inequality.  Tax evasion and tax avoidance are 
important insofar as they affect both the volume and nature of government finances.  
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This paper has  
·  surveyed  the  tax  structures  of  different  regions  of  the  world,  and  examined 
changes over the last three decades; 
·  set up a simple model of tax revenues, and identified the three key leakages –  
i.  the income earned on assets held offshore by wealthy individuals;  
ii.  profits  earned  by  the  corporate  sector  and  then  shifted  to  lower-tax 
jurisdictions; and 
iii. income  from  ‘shadow’  economic  activity,  carried  out  within  the 
economy but not recognised by tax authorities; and 
·  brought  together  existing  assessments  of  the  first  two  leakages  with  a  new 
calculation for the third, to arrive at an overall estimate for the potential revenue 
cost  to  developing  countries  of  leakages  from  the  tax  system.  This  total  is 
approximately $385 billion each year: 
 
Shadow economy:  $285bn 
        Of which ‘feasible’:  $110bn 
Offshore asset-holding:   $50bn 
Corporate profit-shifting:  $50bn 
 
The relative size of these leakages does not provide a rationale for addressing one at the 
expense of other. It is important that the interrelation of attempts to minimise leakages 
is  recognised.  An  attempt,  for  example,  to  address  the  shadow  economy  of  Kenya 
without examining offshore assets and corporate profit-shifting, would have a number 
of unhelpful implications. First, the relative tax burden would be further shifted onto 
those least able to evade it. Politically this is likely to cause difficulties, and all the more 
so if no action is taken in regard to the other leakages. The implications for inequality 
and hence poverty are also potentially damaging. Second, more effective taxation in the 
shadow economy will push more individuals and companies into the other forms of 
evasion; only a concerted attempt to address each together is likely to yield real gains. 
 
The overall absolute size of the leakages is however significant. Standing at more than 
twice any planned official development assistance, the results reinforce a point made in 
the introduction: that ultimately the best ‘new’ source of development finance will be 
the oldest. This is not to dismiss currents efforts to finance the recent pledges of new 
aid,  from  the  International  Finance  Facility  to  the  France-led  tax  on  air  travel,  but 
simply  to  recognise  both  the  difference  in  scale  compared  to  tax  leakages  and  the 
ultimate need for sustainable (domestic) development finance.  This is not however to 
say that development finance must be left to the poor countries of the world. The role 
for the richer in dealing with tax leakages is crucial, and urgent.  
 
While  serious  work  does  exist  on  specific country  systems  (e.g.  Martinez-Vazquez, 
2001) or particular taxes (e.g. Bird, 2005 and Zee, 2005), the challenge faced is greater 
than the attention given thus far. The lack of knowledge, and lack of a critical mass of 




                                                
12 See Cobham (2005) for some discussion of the reasons behind the apparent lack of attention given to 
taxation issues. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 13 
 
What is required is a new agenda for taxation and development – and one in which 
academics, policymakers and campaigners from all regions must play their roles. While 
such a new agenda must be built by the range of involved actors, it is possible to outline 
some  features  here.  Putting  a  long-term  emphasis  on  fiscally  independent,  effective 
states  facilitating  sustainable  human  development  gives  rise  to  a  number  of 
recommendations. First and foremost, it demands that much greater value be placed on 
the fiscal independence of poor country governments. It remains to be seen whether 
such an emphasis changes the priority given to policies such as trade liberalisation.  
 
A second implication is that reconsideration of direct taxation is called for. As figure 1 
illustrated, this has been allowed to drift since the 1980s. The increase in its importance 
prior  to  this  point  suggests  that  such  a  recovery  may  be  achievable  with  sufficient 
political commitment and international support. Re-evaluation of the movement towards 
potentially regressive indirect taxation is also needed.  
 
A third and related implication is that the degree of progressiveness in distribution of 
fiscal  policy  must  be  readdressed.  In  rich  countries,  redistribution  typically  occurs 
through income tax and cash transfers (the latter especially in the US – see Cobham, 
2005).  If  the  latter  are  too  expensive  given  revenue  levels,  or  too  administratively 
demanding given capacity constraints, it may make little sense for poor countries to be 
encouraged to remodel their tax systems on those in rich countries. Alternatively, if the 
existence of easy evasion measures for the earners of high income and profits makes 
more  progressive  direct  taxation  ineffective,  it  suggests  that  the  focus  of  any 
redistribution must be through transfers – with resulting implications for revenue levels 
and administrative capacity.  
 
Emphasis should also of course be put on obtaining access to some of the lost tax 
revenues  identified  here.  For  strictly  domestic  evasion  and  avoidance,  this  requires 
greater  research  into  countermeasures  and  their  potential  effectiveness.  The 
development of tax bases in western European countries during the last century is proof, 
if  it  were  needed,  of  the  possibility  of  progress.  Given  current  patterns  of  shadow 
economic activity, South-South cooperation may be particularly valuable in this area.  
 
The other strand of the agenda is that which campaigners are currently most focused on: 
the  international  nature  of  a  great  deal  of  the  leakages  suffered.  From  automatic 
information exchange between OECD countries,
13 to differential reserve requirements 
for dealings with businesses registered offshore, greater pressure on those jurisdictions 
to  cooperate  (including  pledges  of  international  assistance  to  convert  economic 
structures  into  less  damaging  alternatives),  there  are  a  great  number  of  proposed 
measures likely to produce immediate gains. Giegold (2005) articulates a number of 
demands  that  deserve  serious  consideration  at  least,  including  eventually  an 
international convention on tax cooperation.  
 
                                                
13 At first, the role of OECD countries is stressed. Any immediate attempts to enforce such exchange 
across all countries could be damaging. The benefits are likely to accrue primarily to the richer countries, 
where tax systems’ capacity to respond to new information (and use it to obtain revenues) is likely to be 
higher. The costs are likely to be disproportionately borne by the poorer countries, where tax systems 
have less capacity to deal with additional requirements. First steps could usefully involve provide 
appropriate (and compatible) IT systems to developing countries’ tax offices, as suggested by Kenyan 
Tax Commissioner Jack Ranguma at the Frankfurt conference. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 14 
 
In regard to corporate profit-shifting, there may be limits on the gains to be had from 
tightening scrutiny. Instead, transparency may be the best weapon – to bring increasing 
attention to the actual taxes paid. Rather than expressing shock at the avoidance of 
collapsed companies like Enron  after the fact, NGOs and journalists might usefully 
focus  on  effective  tax  rates  paid  by  existing  businesses.  The  recent  proposal  by 
accountants PriceWaterhouseCoopers for an alternative (more complete) measure of the 
tax contribution of companies, to be reported in accounts, is a positive development 
(although of course care is required with any final outcome, that it is sufficiently precise 
to  be  meaningful  –  including,  for  example,  tax  contributions  of employees  may  be 
unhelpful).  
 
The specific data required to see the development of corporate tax contributions may be 
no more than these: 
i.  gross profits in each jurisdiction 
ii.  gross turnover in each jurisdiction 
iii.  income tax paid in each jurisdiction 
iv.  statutory tax rate in each jurisdiction 
If these were typically provided for each of the last three-five years, then anomalies 
would be very clear. For example, if 10% of turnover but 50% of profits are reported in 
a low-tax jurisdiction, one might expect questions to be posed of the actual extent of 
value-adding economic activity occurring there.  
 
It  would  also  be  a  simple  matter  to  calculate industry  benchmarks  for  comparison; 
extractive industries, for example, typically face higher tax rates, and hence it may be 
unfair to compare directly the performances of Shell with HSBC. Where companies feel 
these (easily and cheaply reported) numbers do not do their actual position justice, they 
would of course be able to add as much additional explanatory information as they 
wished.  While  questions  alone  will  not  change  behaviour,  they  can  contribute  to  a 
differing climate in which companies are under pressure not solely to maximise profits 




A detailed proposal for an international accounting standard to report turnover and tax 
by  location  already  exists,  namely  that  of  Murphy  (2003).  Additional  reporting 
requirements  make  both  parent  and  intermediate  companies  responsible  also  for 
disclosing  turnover  and  tax  information  of  each  related  party,  thereby  making  the 
obscuring  of  e.g.  transfer  pricing  anomalies  much  more  difficult.  Engaging 
policymakers and industry bodies with such a proposal, even at a time when existing 
international standards are raising problems, is an important next step. 
 
This section has set out only the broadest suggestions, such is the range of research and 
policy questions raised. Moving towards a more defined agenda is the next step. There 
may  be  few  easy  answers  to  the  question  of  how  best  to  progress  long-term  fiscal 
sustainability – but the goal is too important for the development community to throw 
its hands up and talk of the futility of chasing shadows.  
                                                
14 For example, Google’s Annual Report for 2004 states: ‘Our effective tax rate beginning in first quarter 
of 2005, and for the foreseeable future thereafter, is expected to be significantly lower than our effective 
tax rate of 39% in 2004. This is primarily because proportionately more of earnings in 2005 compared to 
2004 are  expected  to  be  recognised  by  our  Irish subsidiary,  and  such earnings  are  taxed  at  a lower 
statutory tax rate (12.5%) than in the US (35.0%)’ (p.34). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS129           Page 15 
 
Figure 1: Central government tax revenues (% of GDP), 1970s-1990s 
 
(a) EU-15        (b) US         (c) Japan 
     
 
  (d) Latin America/Caribbean   (e) Central Eastern Europe, W Asia 
      
 
  (f) East Asia        (g) South Asia 
       
 
  (h) Sub-Saharan Africa     (i) MENA 
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Figure 2: Effective tax rates paid by US multinationals 
 
 
Source: calculations on US Department of Commerce data. 
 
 
Figure 3: Channels of tax leakages 
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GDP  Revenue, 
ex. grants  Trade tax  Aid  Health 
(public) 
Education 
(public)  Trade tax 
  US$ per capita  % of revenues 
               
Developing countries               
     By income level               
Low income countries  409  54  10  10  6  16  18.2 
Lower-middle income countries  1304  184  16  8  35  43  8.4 
Upper-middle income countries  5463  1055  56  10  190  251  5.3 
     By region               
East Asia and Pacific  924  95  8  4  17  25  8.7 
Europe and Central Asia  2094  651  35  20  84  88  5.4 
Latin America and Caribbean  3646  649  48  9  123  165  7.5 
Middle East and North Africa  2164  437  44  17  57  87  10.1 
South Asia  460  55  10  4  6  17  17.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  495  148  14  20  13  29  9.6 
               
High income countries               
OECD members  27210  7083  58  0  1712  1382  0.8 
     Of which: EMU members  20945  7757  12  0  1438  1042  0.2 
Non-OECD  18605  4835  85  58  621  916  1.8 
               
Memorando               
Highly indebted poor countries  294  41  9  27  6  11  22.1 
 
Notes: Calculated from World Development Indicators (2005). Data are averages for 1999-2002. 
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economy  Tax revenue  Potential tax 
revenue 
       
Developing countries       
     By income level       
Low income countries  32.7  10.4  13.7 
Lower-middle income countries  31.5  13.8  18.2 
Upper-middle income countries  29.5  16.6  21.5 
     By region       
East Asia and Pacific  21.4  9.1  11.1 
Europe and Central Asia  38.1  19.8  27.3 
Latin America and Caribbean  37.7  15.5  21.4 
Middle East and North Africa  26.3  16.3  20.5 
South Asia  28.5  9.4  12.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  41.1  20.4  28.7 
       
High income countries       
OECD members  12.9  22.2  25.1 
     Of which: EMU members  18.5  28.4  33.7 
Non-OECD  21.7  18.4  22.4 
 
 
Note:  Data  for  shadow  economy  refer  to  2002/3  (source:  Schneider,  2005).  Data  for  GDP 
weightings  refer  to  2003  (source:  WDI,  2005).  Data  for  tax  revenues  refer  to  latest  year 
available, typically 2002/03 (source: WDI, 2004; 2005 edition where useful update possible).  I 
am grateful to Brent Cloete for pointing out an anomaly in an earlier version of this table. 
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Table 3: Potential tax revenues lost to shadow economy 
 
      Effect of ‘formalising’ entire shadow economy  Effects of ‘feasible formalisation’ 
  Shadow economy  Tax revenue  Remaining shadow  Potential tax increase  Remaining shadow  Potential tax increase 
  (% of official GDP)  (US$, billions)  (% of official GDP)  (US$, billions)  (% of official GDP)  (US$, billions) 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) = A*B  (E)  (F) = (A-E)*B 
Developing countries    920.8    285.8    111.2 
     By income level             
Low income countries  32.7  96.6  0.0  31.6  19.5  12.8 
Lower-middle income countries  31.5  557.2  0.0  175.4  19.1  69.0 
Upper-middle income countries  29.5  267.0  0.0  78.7  18.4  29.5 
     By region             
East Asia and Pacific  21.4  182.2  0.0  39.0  15.7  10.3 
Europe and Central Asia  38.1  268.4  0.0  102.2  21.3  45.0 
Latin America and Caribbean  37.7  265.5  0.0  100.2  21.2  43.9 
Middle East and North Africa  26.3  70.9  0.0  18.6  17.4  6.3 
South Asia  28.5  71.3  0.0  20.3  18.1  7.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  41.1  62.6  0.0  25.7  22.3  11.7 
             
High income countries    6367.8    828.5    90.3¹ 
OECD members  12.9  6298.3  0.0  813.4  12.9  0.0 
     Of which: EMU members  18.5  2329.3  0.0  430.1  14.8  86.2 
Non-OECD  21.7  69.5  0.0  15.1  15.8  4.1 
 
Notes: Underlying data as per Table 2 above. ‘Feasible formalisation’ refers to each group of countries reducing the difference between the size of their own shadow 
economies and those of high income OECD countries.  
1. The total tax revenue increase for high-income countries in the ‘feasible formalisation’ case is $90.3 billion if EMU members address the excess of their shadow 
economies over the OECD average. Evidently however if the OECD average was to remain at 12.9% of official GDP, other members would have to see an expansion 
and hence a lower value would emerge. This would be a curious assumption to make. 
 




Alkire, S., 2002, ‘Dimensions of human development’, World Development 30:2, pp. 181-205. 
Baker, R., 2005, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market 
System, Chichester: Wiley. 
Baumsgaard, T. & M. Keen, 2005, ‘Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization’, IMF Working 
Paper 05/112. 
Bird, R., 2005, ‘Value-added taxes in developing and transitional countries: Lessons and 
questions’, International Studies Program (AYSPS -GSU) Working Paper 05-05. 
Bulí￿, A. and J. Hamann, ‘Volatility of development aid: From the frying pan into the fire?’, 
paper prepared for IMF seminar, Maputo, 14-15 March. 
Christian Aid, 2005, ‘The shirts off their backs: How tax policies fleece the poor’, Christian Aid 
Briefing Paper; available at http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/509tax/. 
Cobham, A., 2005, ‘Taxation policy and development’, OCGG Economy Section Project Paper 
EPP 05-01, Oxford: Oxford Council on Good Governance. 
Emran, S. and J. Stiglitz, 2002, ‘On selective indirect tax reform in developing countries’, 
mimeo., University of Columbia. 
Giegold, S., 2005, ‘Combating international tax evasion and competition’, paper presented at 
International Policy Dialogue on New Sources of Development Financing, Frankfurt, 
24
th August. 
Google, 2004, Annual Report, Mountain View, California: Google. 
Lensink, R., and O. Morrissey, 2000, ' Aid instability as a measure of uncertainty and the 
positive impact of aid on growth' , Journal of Development Studies 36:3, pp.30-48. 
Martinez-Vazques, J., 2001, ‘Mexico: An evaluation of the main features of the tax system’, 
International Studies Program (AYSPS-GSU) Working Paper 01-12. 
Murphy, R., 2003, A Proposed International Accounting Standard: Reporting Turnover and Tax 
by Location, Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs; available at 
http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/ProposedAccstd.pdf.  
Oxfam, 2000, ‘Tax havens: Releasing the hidden billions for poverty eradication’, Briefing 
Paper, Oxford: Oxfam GB. 
Pallage, S. and M. Robe, 2001, ‘Foreign aid and the business cycle,’ Review of International 
Economics 9, pp. 636–67. 
PwC, 2005, ‘Total Tax Contribution Framework: What is your company’s overall tax 
contribution?’, PwC Discussion Paper, London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
RBS, 2005, ‘Media Factsheet: Annual Report 2004’, 24
th February, Edinburgh: Royal Bank of 
Scotland. 
Ross,  M.,  2004,  ‘Does  taxation lead  to  representation?’,  mimeo.,  Dept  of  Political  Science, 
University of California. 
Schneider, F., 2005, ‘Shadow economies of 145 countries all over the world: What do we really 
know?’, mimeo., University of Linz. 
TJN, 2005, ‘The price of offshore’, Briefing Paper, London: Tax Justice Network; available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore.pdf.   
Zee,  H.,  2005,  ‘Personal  income  tax  reform:  Concepts,  issues,  and  comparative  country 
developments’, IMF Working Paper 05/87. 